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a b s t r a c t
This paper presents a framework for analysis and comparison of privacy policies expressed
in P3P (Platform for Privacy Preferences). In contrast to existing approaches to policy
analysis, which focus on demonstrations of equality or equivalence of policies, our
approach makes it possible to check for refinement between policies. We automatically
generate a CSPmodel from a P3P policy, which represents the policy’s intended semantics;
using the FDR model checker, we then perform various tests (using process refinement)
to determine (a) whether a policy is internally consistent, and (b) whether a given policy
refines another by permitting similar data collection, processing and sharing practices. Our
approach allows for the detection of subtle differences between practices prescribed by
different privacy policies, the comparison of relative levels of privacy offered by different
policies, and captures the semantics of policies intended in the original P3P standard.
The systematic translation of policies to CSP provides a formal means of reasoning about
websites’ privacy policies, and therefore the practices of various enterprises with regards
to personal data.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In our digital age more and more of society’s benefits and services are provided online; for access to these, we find
ourselves constantly being asked for personal information. Meanwhile, enterprise information systems are amassing ever
growing digital piles of data pertaining to individuals, data which is often regarded as having huge commercial value.
Databases can be indexed, searched and sorted as dictated by enterprise needs, although data processing practices are
always expected to comply with current law and data protection agreements. Unfortunately there seems to be a big gap
between customers’ expectation of privacy and the actual privacy provided through common business practice.
Website users are often unaware of and unconcerned by any privacy policy that may be in effect during an online
transaction.Where such a policy is expressly provided, it often takes the formof a lengthy legal documentwhich is presented
to the user for himor her to accept or reject completely. Interestingly, there is no provision for the user to opt out of individual
clauses of such a policy, and he or she is expected to grant ‘blanket consent’ for all uses of their data set out in the policy
document. Somewebsites provide the ability to opt in or opt out of being contacted formarketing purposes, but the controls
available are not very fine grained and only exist to satisfy the minimum requirements of the law (e.g. the Data Protection
Act in the UK). There is an increasing body of work on developing better privacy controls for users; see for example the
PRIME [1], PrimeLife [2] and EnCoRe [3] research projects.
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The Privacy Preferences Platform Project (P3P) [4] is focused on developing machine readable XML for expressing
websites’ privacy policies and users’ privacy preferences; this is intended to enable the use of privacy-aware browsers
and to allow websites to collect and process information they may require in a fashion that respects user privacy. The
policy languages developed within P3P so far are lacking a formal semantics and hence are prone to inconsistency and
ambiguity [5]. XACML [6] is a language for expressing role-based access control, which has been augmented with a ‘‘profile’’
for expressing privacy policies [7], but until recently lacked a formal semantics (the latest version, XACML 2.0, has a draft
formal semantics). The lack of a widely accepted semantics for privacy policies is the main source of difficulty in policy
comparison.
We are interested in the use of privacy policies as a means to protecting personal data in cyberspace. As we argue below,
itmay be desirable to compare two related policies, particularlywhen these policies are expressed using different languages.
However, even when two policies are expressed in the same language, it is possible that they will differ syntactically but
supposedly express the same intention. If mistakes are made in the comparison of privacy policies this could result in the
wrong policy being implemented and exposure to risk.
Policy refinement [8] is a term used to refer to the process of synthesising lower level policies from policies expressing
higher level concerns. An enterprise typically has to conform with many different sets of policies and, for any particular
context, such as privacy, there will be a policy hierarchy that specifies the order and priority of policies which must be
enforced. In such a hierarchy one will find policies which are all intended for essentially the same goal, but they differ
in the details; a higher-level policy may stipulate, for instance, that adequate protections on customer data must be in
place, while a lower-level policy would detail the encryption mechanisms and access controls used to protect such data.
The lower-level policy is said to refine the higher-level one when it only permits data processing permitted by the higher-
level policy. Our focus on refinement as opposed to equality of policies is justified by the need to check that one policy is a
valid implementation of another, as might arise in the setting of a supply chain. Consider, for example, the situation where
a user shares personal data with an organisation and in doing so stipulates a range of preferences on how that data should
be handled. If the data is passed onto a third party it will be necessary to ensure that the policy adopted by the third party
offers at least as much privacy as the original organisation.
Our intention in this paper is to connect the concept of policy refinement (particularly in the context of privacy) with
the notion of refinement as used in process algebra, by developing a translation of P3P policies into CSP processes which
can be directly compared using the FDR model checker1 [9,10]. Using this translation, one can perform three types of
analysis:
• Comparison of two given P3P policies as to the data collection, processing and sharing practices which they each
prescribe.
• Comparison of a given P3P policy with an enterprise’s higher-level privacy goals (and possibly with customer
requirements).
• Consistency checking of a given P3P policy, to prevent ambiguities.
The translation of policies to CSP gives them a uniform representationwhichmakes it convenient to reason about privacy
requirements and dependencies between policy rules. With FDR it is then possible to automatically check that overall
goals are being met; if they are not, FDR produces counterexamples which can be used to determine sources of errors and
inconsistencies.
While we are aware of some existing work on direct comparison of P3P policies (see Section 1.1), we believe that our
approach is particularly well-suited to the task of policy comparison, in that it permits a fine grained analysis: rather than
just comparing the overall effects of two given policies, we compare the collection, processing and sharing practices of each
policy for each data item individually. Furthermore,we take into account the intended semantics of the predefined constants
in the P3P standard;most existing policy comparison approaches are syntactic, in that they do notmake any effort to capture
the dependencies and possible conflicts between the values allowed in policy rules.
It is worth noting here that, as of this writing, the latest (and final) version of P3P is 1.1 and, while this language is still in
use for specifying website privacy policies, it has been somewhat superseded by the XACML standard. However, the wide
availability of tools such as the IBM P3P Policy Editor [11] and the Privacy Finder search engine [12] make it easy to edit,
manage and locate real-world privacy policies, and the language is still widely used. For these reasons, P3P policies are
worthy of further study and analysis. Future work is likely to include extending the techniques presented in this paper to
other policy languages.
1.1. Related work
Related work includes research on the formalisation and automatic processing of P3P and XACML policies. There is also
purely theoretical work onmathematically describing access control and its properties, though there is a lack of formalwork
on the analysis of privacy.
1 FDR is a product of Formal Systems (Europe) Ltd (http://www.fsel.com) and the University of Oxford (http://web.comlab.ox.ac.uk/projects/
concurrency_tools).
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May et al. [13] define ‘policy relations’ in an analogous way to bisimulation for concurrent processes; their high-level
semantic framework is used for comparing P3P policy outcomes. Their approach is mathematically elegant as it avoids
comparing specific actions permitted by a policy, and focuses only on the outcomes of applying it; however it corresponds
to an equivalence check between policies, rather than a more fine-grained refinement check.
Yu et al. [14] have proposed a relational semantics for P3P, in an effort to give unambiguous meaning to syntactically
different expressions of a single policy. Their ideas are complementary to the approach we propose, although they focus
only on internal policy consistency. Known ambiguities and problems with P3P policies have been studied by Hogben [5],
and these issues inspired both [14] and the present work.
Stamey and Rossi [15] applied Latent Semantic Analysis techniques to interpret and compare sets of legal privacy policies
(expressed in natural language, of course). They investigate linguistic patterns arising in the texts of privacy policies,
identifying high-frequency words and semantic similarities.
Bryans [16] builds on earlier work by Ryan [17] and develops a CSPmodel of XACML access control policies. The emphasis
in this paper is on applications related to separation of duty constraints and workflow.
Fisler et al. [18] presents the Margrave tool for analysing and reasoning about XACML access control policies; Margrave
translates policies into a decision diagram representation which allows a user to pose queries about the policy and its
properties.
Zhang et al. [19] describes a tool and associated formalism, RW, for writing specifications of access control policies from
which valid XACML can be generated.
Gunter et al. [20] defines a formal privacy system as a mathematical object, namely a labelled transition system with a
set of predefined actions that arise in the context of location-aware services.
May et al. [21] extends [20] by incorporating notification and logging operations and by proposing a formal translation
to Promela, the input language of the SPIN model checker.
Fournet et al. [22] uses process algebra to express a logic of authorisation, while Walker [23] develops a type system for
reasoning about security policies; both approaches demonstrate how authorisation or access control can be formalised.
Becker et al. [24] have designed a declarative language, S4P (or SecPAL4P) for expressing privacy preferences and policies.
Theyprovide a formal semantics andproof rules for their language. Theydonot seem todefine a directmapping fromexisting
formalisms such as P3P or XACML into their language, however.
1.2. Outline of this paper
There are five parts to this paper. Section 2 describes P3P policy structure, constants and intended semantics; this leads
to a discussion of what it means for a given P3P policy to refine another. Section 3 discusses how we model a P3P policy
in CSP, and the tool we have developed for performing the conversion automatically. Then in Sections 4 and 5 we discuss
the process refinement checks that we can perform on a policy and on a pair of policies, respectively, using FDR. Finally,
Section 6 concludes with a discussion of future work.
2. Understanding P3P policies and their semantics
First it is necessary to pin down exactly what wemean by the term ‘P3P policy,’ since theW3C Recommendation [4] does
define a number of similar terms. A P3P-compatible website that collects and uses personal data will have associated with it
a policy reference file, which is a listing of all the policy files that apply to the different pages in the site. P3P is an instantiation
of XML, so both files are expressed in this format, using only the tag names and values defined in the Recommendation. A
policy file may generally contain any number of actual policies. For the purposes of this paper wework only with policy files
consisting of a single policy, and this assumption is also made by the tool described in Section 3. However, the technique
can generally handle any number of policies within a policy file.
2.1. Structure of an individual policy
Apolicy defines a set of rules, or statements, that specifywhichprocessing and sharing practices are permitted for different
types of data that thewebsitemay collect. Statementswill refer to types of data explicitly referred to in theRecommendation,
namely dynamic data, user data, business data and third party data. For each of these types of data the Recommendation
defines a schema, and there are a number of predefined constantswhich are used in actual policies (see Section 2.2), although
user-defined types are also allowed. For the needs of this paper we assume that policies only use predefined types. The
predefined types are termed ‘datagroups’.
A statement includes:
• a <DATA-GROUP> element,
• a <PURPOSE> element,
• a <RECIPIENT> element,
• a <RETENTION> element,
• (optionally) a <CONSEQUENCE> element,
• (optionally) other extensions.
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<POLICY xml:lang="en">
<STATEMENT>
<PURPOSE><admin/>
<current/>
<develop/>
</PURPOSE>
<RECIPIENT><ours/></RECIPIENT>
<RETENTION><stated-purpose/>
</RETENTION>
<DATA-GROUP>
<DATA ref="#dynamic.clickstream"/>
<DATA ref="#dynamic.http"/>
</DATA-GROUP>
</STATEMENT>
</POLICY>
Fig. 1. Policy A
A statement is intended to express a policy rule that, it is permitted for the website to collect a datum belonging to the
given datagroup for the specified purpose, for a period of time defined by <RETENTION>, and for distribution only to those
entities defined in the <RECIPIENT> element. We ignore optional elements in this paper.
2.2. Predefined constants
The values that are permitted in the elements of a statement are the following (we do not include the data schema, which
defines the possible values for datagroups, for lack of space):
• for <PURPOSE>:
– current, admin, develop, tailoring, pseudo-analysis, pseudo-decision, individual-analysis, individual-decision, contact,
historical, telemarketing, other-purpose
• for <RECIPIENT>:
– ours, delivery, same, other-recipient, unrelated, public
• for <RETENTION>:
– no-retention, stated-purpose, legal-requirement, business-practices, indefinitely
While an explanation of each value is given in the Recommendation, it should be noted that the purposes in particular
are subject to some degree of interpretation, in that a website owner may choose quite loosely among these values. The
different values for <RECIPIENT> describe the nature of an entity with whom data is being shared; the value ours applies
when data is to be used exclusively by the owner of the website and by third parties who need it for a stated purpose only.
The value delivery applies when data is to be shared with service providers whose practices are unknown and may differ
from those of the site owner. Values same and other-recipient are used for data that may be shared with third parties whose
data practices are either identical or different, respectively, to those of the site owner, and the other values are special cases.
For the values that describe the data retention practices, it is interesting to note that there is no numerical value (such
as, for instance, a 30-day limit on the use of data). The values range from no retention at all to indefinite retention.
While the Recommendation does not define any relationships between these predefined values, we believe that the
semantics of the language would be significantly less ambiguous if the permitted recipients and retention practices in a
given policy depended on the purpose(s) for which data collection is taking place.
2.3. Examples of policies and refinement
In this section we will use two example P3P policies to explain the notion of policy refinement. As we will see, a purely
syntactic comparison would treat these policies as being different from one another, esp. in terms of stated purpose; we
show that there is a relationship of refinement between the two. The example should make clear why refinement is useful
in this context, and more effective as a comparison tool than a notion of equality or equivalence of policies.
Fig. 1 shows a policy, Policy A, consisting of a single statement that applies to two different datagroups, #dynamic.
clickstream and #dynamic.http. These data groups refer to the data available on aweb site server log about the access
requests it has received. In particular,
‘‘The clickstreamelement is expected to apply to practically allWeb sites. It represents the combination of information
typically found in Web server access logs: the IP address or hostname of the user’s computer, the URI of the resource
requested, the time the request was made, the HTTP method used in the request, the size of the response, and the
HTTP status code in the response.’’ [4]
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<POLICY xml:lang="en">
<STATEMENT>
<PURPOSE><admin/>
</PURPOSE>
<RECIPIENT><ours/></RECIPIENT>
<RETENTION><stated-purpose/>
</RETENTION>
<DATA-GROUP>
<DATA ref="#dynamic.clickstream"/>
<DATA ref="#dynamic.http"/>
</DATA-GROUP>
</STATEMENT>
</POLICY>
Fig. 2. Policy B
Policy A requires that these datagroups be collected for administrative, current, and development purposes, for a period
of time determined by the enterprise’s stated purpose, and sharing is only permitted with third parties who will use it for a
stated purpose (note the meaning of the constant ours, which does in fact allow limited sharing).
Policy B in Fig. 2 has a statement that applies to the very same datagroups. It may have been defined at a later stage to
Policy A, when the enterprise completed deployment of a new version of its website. How does it compare to Policy A?
If these two policies were compared directly using existing approaches, such as policy relations [13], or by means of a
syntactic comparison, theywould be found to be substantially different.While the two policies are certainly not equal, since
they differ in the number of purposes for which collection is being performed, there is clearly a similarity between the two,
in that everything policy B permits is also permitted by policy A. We say that Policy A is refined by Policy B and write A ⊑ B.
The approach to policy comparison advanced in the following sections attempts to take into considerationmeanings and
intentions of the predefined constants.
3. Modelling P3P policies in CSP
We have developed tool support2 for translating a P3P policy into a CSP model that can be checked using FDR. In this
section we present the structure of such models and discuss our design choices.
For definitions of the CSP notations, including among others external choice (P  Q ), indexed external choice (i Pi),
parallel composition (P ∥ Q ), the predefined CHAOS process and more we refer the reader to the standard reference [9]. We
assume familiarity with these notations and concepts.
Given a P3P policy file, which contains a single privacy policy, our translator extracts all the different statements, and
generates definitions of CSP processes corresponding to each statement. The first (top-level) process corresponding to a P3P
statement will be referred to as a rule process. To represent the policy as a whole, we will use a single process combining
together all rule processes in parallel composition.
3.1. Modelling P3P statements
From the kth P3P statement in a given policy, only the DATA-GROUP, PURPOSE, RECIPIENT and RETENTION elements
are extracted. The process RULEk,dg0 contains a collect event, which corresponds to the collection of an item in datagroup dg ,
for purposes P = {pn} (n ≥ 1) and retention t , with the possibility of sharing to recipients r , and is defined as follows:
RULEk,dg0 = collect.dg.p1.r.t → RULEk,dg1
 collect.dg.p2.r.t → RULEk,dg2
...
 collect.dg.pn.r.t → RULEk,dgn
For the specified purposes pi ∈ {p1, . . . , pn}, with i ≤ n, in the P3P statement, we define RULEk,dgi as a state in which
processing of the data dg for purpose pi, followed by further collection, further processing for purpose pi, or sharing with
recipient r (through RULEk,dgn+1 ) is permitted.
RULEk,dgi = process.dg.pi.t →

RULEk,dg0  RULE
k,dg
i  RULE
k,dg
n+1

2 This is a Python program, which is available on request.
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We define RULEk,dgn+1 as a state in which sharing with recipient r is possible, followed by either further collection, further
processing, or further sharing:
RULEk,dgn+1 = share.dg.r →

RULEk,dg0 

i RULEk,dgi

 RULEk,dgn+1

In order to handle the retention value specified in P3P statements, we include in our model for each statement a clock, or
counter. A full description of a P3P statement is given by synchronising the top-level rule process with this counter. At time
instant 0, the counter only permits collection events to be triggered. Thus we have the counter process:
COUNTINIT (d, P, r, t) = COUNT (val_of (t), d, P, r, t)
The use of a counter is a way of addressing the fact that standard CSP does not allow for time constraints and specifications.
If we had chosen to use the formalism of Timed CSP [25] this could have been avoided, but FDR only supports untimed CSP,
so this would not be practical for our purposes.
We have taken the convention of assigning the following numerical values to retentions:
val_of (no_retention) = 1
val_of (stated_purpose) = 2
val_of (legal_requirement) = 5
val_of (indefinitely) = 100
val_of (business_practices) = 10
Note that our choice of numerical values for these constants is based on our interpretation of the P3P standard and has been
validated through discussions with legal and regulatory experts. Should the intended interpretation of the constants change
or require adjustment, this is easy to implement.
The COUNT process specifies when different events are permitted, with the intention that processing and sharing events
should only be possible while a collected data item can be retained. Once the time for which a data item is available has
lapsed, processing and sharing are no longer possible, and the item should be collected anew. There is a separate instance
of COUNT for every combination of d, P , r , t . The process counts downwards to ensure a bounded state space in the model,
which is necessary for model checking. This is expressed in the following process definition.
COUNT (cnt, d, P, r, t) = cnt > 0 &

(p collect.d.p.r.t → COUNT (cnt, d, P, r, t))
 (p process.d.p → COUNT (cnt − 1, d, P, r, t))
 share.d.r → COUNT (cnt − 1, d, P, r, t)

 cnt = 0 &

p collect.d.p.r.t → COUNTINIT (d, P, r, t)

So, a P3P statement for datagroup dg , with purposes P = {pi, i ≤ n}, recipient r and retention t is fully defined in CSP by
a process of the form:
RULEk,dg = RULEk,dg0 |[∀p ∈ P • collect.d.p.r.t, process.d.p, share.d.r]|COUNTINIT (d, P, r, t)
Example. The definitions given in the previous section are easily understood by way of an example. Suppose we wish
to express the statement contained in Policy A (see Fig. 2) in CSP. The statement in Policy A applies to two datagroups,
dynamic_clickstream and dynamic_http. The corresponding CSP code for dynamic_clickstream datagroup is shown below,
where we have abbreviated RULE1,dynamic_clickstream to RULEa for clarity.
RULEa = RULEa0 |[∀p ∈ {admin, current, develop} •
collect.dynamic_clickstream.p.ours.stated_purpose,
process.dynamic_clickstream.p.ours.stated_purpose,
share.dynamic_clickstream.ours]|
COUNTINIT (dynamic_clickstream, {admin, current, develop}, ours, stated_purpose)
RULEa0 = collect.dynamic_clickstream.admin.ours.stated_purpose → RULEa1
 collect.dynamic_clickstream.current.ours.stated_purpose → RULEa2
 collect.dynamic_clickstream.develop.ours.stated_purpose → RULEa3
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RULEa1 = process.dynamic_clickstream.admin.ours.stated_purpose
→ (RULEa0  RULEa1  RULEa4)
RULEa2 = process.dynamic_clickstream.current.ours.stated_purpose
→ (RULEa0  RULEa2  RULEa4)
RULEa3 = process.dynamic_clickstream.develop.ours.stated_purpose
→ (RULEa0  RULEa3  RULEa4)
RULEa4 = share.dynamic_clickstream.ours
→ (RULEa0  RULEa1  RULEa2  RULEa3  RULEa4)
3.2. Modelling a policy
A policy is defined by the totality of statements it contains, and therefore can be expressed as the parallel composition
of all the RULEk,dg processes for all k and all dg:
POLICY = |||k,dg RULEk,dg
With this definition in hand we can perform analyses of the kind discussed in the Introduction.
The analyses rely on the notion of refinement as conventionally used in process algebra. We use the symbol⊑ to denote
a relation of refinement between two processes. When there is no subscript this may denote either traces refinement
(normally⊑T ) or failures refinement (normally⊑F ) depending on the context.We review the definition of traces refinement
in Section 5.
4. Consistency checking
As we have noted, the semantics of P3P lack a formal, unambiguous definition, and this has been the source of criticism.
Using the CSP model of a P3P policy presented in the previous section, we can perform checks using the FDR model checker
that the stipulations of a policy are plausible and compatible with the P3P Recommendation. While the Recommendation
lists a number of predefined values for the PURPOSE, RECIPIENT and RETENTION specified in any statement, it does
not explicitly describe dependencies and potential conflicts between those values. It is assumed by the authors of the
Recommendation that users of the language will make sensible and compatible choices when authoring policies; we feel
that consistency checks are not only necessary to ensure syntactic correctness of a policy, but that they can be used to warn
against dangerous or implausible policy statements.
For instance, the Recommendation specifies thatwhen no_retention is specified for a given datagroup, the data in question
should be used only for a single online transaction and must be subsequently destroyed. When this is given as the retention
policy, it should by definition preclude the possibility that the website owner will use the data for any other purpose than
those corresponding to tailoring and current. Other predefined values for PURPOSE must not be permitted if data is not
retained for a longer time, since they all assume that the data being collected will be held for further processing. The P3P
Recommendation does not explicitly disallow other purposes for data collection, although this is clearly necessary as the
resulting statements would be implausible.
Consider how this type of inconsistency can be prevented in the CSP model. We can define a process TIMELY (d), for each
datagroup d, which allows processing only for the current and tailoring purposes if d has been collected for no_retention. To
do a consistency check on a given policy POLICYA wewill use a process CONSISTENCY1 which permits only this behaviour for
all datagroups.
TIMELY (d) = collect.d._._.t →
(if t = no_retention
then CHAOS(process.d.current, process.d.tailoring)
else CHAOS(process.d) △ TIMELY (d))
CONSISTENCY1 = |||d •TIMELY (d)
The consistency check is performed by testing that (note that we need to ignore share events):
CONSISTENCY1 ⊑T POLICYA\{share}
Note that in this form, the process CONSISTENCY1 does not allow for two different collect events to occur prior to process-
ing/sharing. This is just a convention used for the needs of the examples in this paper, but the definition can be generalised.
A similar situation in P3P arises with the predefined values for recipients. The values delivery, other_recipient, unrelated
and public are all used in cases where the recipient of the data generally follows different data collection practices than the
owner of the website with the policy. In the descriptions of most predefined purposes for which data may be collected, it
is assumed that a third party will follow the same practices as the website owner. The Recommendation does not explicitly
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constrain, for which purposes, sharing with third parties that follow different practices should be permitted. It is likely, and
definitely in line with customer expectations, that third parties following different data collection practices to the owner of
a site should be prevented from obtaining this data with very few exceptions. As a consistency check, it may be sensible to
check that a policy which allows sharing of data with such recipients only does so for the purpose of contacting a customer
(namely, in the case of the predefined constant contact for the PURPOSE.
It is also sensible to have a check that prevents collection of data for unspecified purposes. The P3P Recommendation
allows a policy to specify a retention value, for a given datagroup, of indefinitely, while also permitting anunspecified purpose
(in the case of the value other_purposes.
These checks can be expressed in our CSP model in an analogous manner to CONSISTENCY1.
5. Refinement checking
As explained in the Introduction, it is important to be able to compare two given policies together in order to see if they
express the same intention, if they are simply equal, or whether they permit similar data collection, processing and sharing
practices.
We can perform a simple test for trace refinement to see whether the top-level processes describing two policies refine
one another. If we have two policies, P1 and P2, with corresponding CSP processes POLICY1 and POLICY2, this amounts to
checking whether:
POLICY1 ⊑T POLICY2 (1)
POLICY2 ⊑T POLICY1 (2)
where the notation P ⊑T Q denotes trace refinement.
It is worthwhile to remind the reader here of the notion and use of trace refinement as used in process algebra. A trace is
any finite or infinite sequence of steps (actions) that a given process may take or perform, according to its specification, in a
given execution. The set of all traces of a process P is denoted traces(P). For given processes P and Q we say that P is refined
by Q , or P ⊑T Q , if and only if traces(P) ⊇ traces(Q ). Process Q refines process P in the sense that its possible behaviours are
fewer than those of P , so any user or system expecting to work or interact with process Q will be content with encountering
P instead.
If the relations (1) and (2) both hold, then this means that the two P3P policies P1 and P2 are exactly identical, specifying
the same statements in effectively the same order. This is not a case of much practical interest, and it may be more helpful
to compare the individual practices permitted by P1 with those permitted by P2.
In Section 5.1 we discuss a realistic example (which uses refinement as shown in (1)) in which two policies are compared
as to their overall effect (namely, the totality of practices permitted by each of the two policies). In Section 5.2 we develop
checks which allow to detect differences between the practices permitted by two policies.
5.1. Detailed example of a full refinement check
In this section we demonstrate our approach by building a CSP model to compare two realistic privacy policies, shown
in Figs. 3 and 4.
It is evident that both policies refer to three different datagroups, #dynamic.http, #dynamic.clickstream and
#dynamic.cookies. Policy C comprises three distinct statements, one for each datagroup, while Policy D has two
statements, with the second statement applying to both datagroups #dynamic.http and #dynamic.cookies. Notice
the differences in retentions between the statements.
Our aim is to show that Policy C is refined by Policy D, or C ⊑ D.
The differences between these policies are summarised in Figs. 5 and 6.
Using our translation tool (as discussed in Section 3), we convert these policies to CSP models with top-level processes
POLICYC and POLICYD. The corresponding CSP code, along with the check below is available online at http://www.dcs.
warwick.ac.uk/∼nikos/downloads/sampleref.csp.
To check refinement, we abstract away from the different purposes and retentions in collect events, as it is their
occurrence that resets the retention counter, independently of the other parameters. To do this we define a function abs:
abs(P) = P[∀dg, p, r, t • collect.dg.p.r.t → learn.dg.r]
and the refinement check which shows that C ⊑ D is:
abs(POLICYC ) ⊑T abs(POLICYD)
This check succeeds in FDR as expected.
5.2. Separate checks for collection, processing and sharing practices
If any of the refinement checks mentioned in this section fails, it is an indication of a difference in particular practices in
the policies under comparison. This allows a user to locate particular differences that may be of interest.
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<POLICY xml:lang="en">
<STATEMENT>
<PURPOSE><admin/>
<current/>
<develop/>
</PURPOSE>
<RECIPIENT><ours/></RECIPIENT>
<RETENTION><indefinitely/>
</RETENTION>
<DATA-GROUP>
<DATA ref="#dynamic.clickstream"/>
</DATA-GROUP>
</STATEMENT>
<STATEMENT>
<PURPOSE><admin/>
<current/>
</PURPOSE>
<RECIPIENT><ours/></RECIPIENT>
<RETENTION><legal-requirement/>
</RETENTION>
<DATA-GROUP>
<DATA ref="#dynamic.http"/>
</DATA-GROUP>
</STATEMENT>
<STATEMENT>
<PURPOSE><current/>
<develop/>
</PURPOSE>
<RECIPIENT><ours/></RECIPIENT>
<RETENTION><stated-purpose/>
</RETENTION>
<DATA-GROUP>
<DATA ref="#dynamic.cookies"/>
</DATA-GROUP>
</STATEMENT>
</POLICY>
Fig. 3. Policy C.
In order to compare data collection practices of P1 and P2 (so as to see, for example, if one policy requires the collection
of the same types data or more types than the other), we define a set of processes which detect, for all datagroups dg , all the
collect events for the different allowed retentions. We define:
Collections(no_retention) =  dg : Datagroup • collect.dg.p.r.no_retention
→ Collections(no_retention)
Collections(stated_purpose) =  dg : Datagroup • collect.dg.p.r.stated_purpose
→ Collections(stated_purpose)
...
Collections(indefinitely) =  dg : Datagroup • collect.dg.p.r.indefinitely
→ Collections(indefinitely)
By composing POLICY1 with Collections(p), for each of the purposes p, while synchronising on collection events, we obtain
a set of new processes that represent the collection practices permitted by policy P1. We do similarly for policy P2.
TEST1(t) = POLICY1|[{collect.dg.p.r.t}]|Collections(t)
TEST2(t) = POLICY2|[{collect.dg.p.r.t}]|Collections(t)
We can compare the collection practices of the two policies by checking that, for each t:
TEST1(t) ⊑F TEST2(t)
where the notation P ⊑F P ′ denotes failures refinement, i.e. failures(P ′) ⊆ failures(P).
N. Papanikolaou et al. / Science of Computer Programming 77 (2012) 1198–1209 1207
<POLICY xml:lang="en">
<STATEMENT>
<PURPOSE><admin/>
<develop/>
</PURPOSE>
<RECIPIENT><ours/></RECIPIENT>
<RETENTION><stated-purpose/>
</RETENTION>
<DATA-GROUP>
<DATA ref="#dynamic.clickstream"/>
</DATA-GROUP>
</STATEMENT>
<STATEMENT>
<PURPOSE><current/>
</PURPOSE>
<RECIPIENT><ours/></RECIPIENT>
<RETENTION><no_retention/>
</RETENTION>
<DATA-GROUP>
<DATA ref="#dynamic.http"/>
<DATA ref="#dynamic.cookies"/>
</DATA-GROUP>
</STATEMENT>
</POLICY>
Fig. 4. Policy D.
Statement Datagroup Purposes Recipients Retention
1 dynamic_clickstream {current,admin,develop} ours indefinitely
2 dynamic_http {current, admin} ours legal_requirement
3 dynamic_cookies {current, develop} ours stated_purpose
Fig. 5. Comparing policies: Policy C.
Statement Datagroup Purposes Recipients Retention
1 dynamic_clickstream {admin, develop} ours stated_purpose
2
dynamic_http
dynamic_cookies {current} ours no_retention
Fig. 6. Comparing policies: Policy D.
Failures refinement is used here in order to compare the sets of actions which these processes will be unable to perform
by definition. If we were to compare traces this would only allow us to compare the space of all possible behaviours; but to
compare the abilities of processes not to perform certain events (in this case, events representing particular data collection
practices) allows us to contrast them more directly.
We have similar tests for the processing and sharing practices of the two policies. For comparing processing practices,
we define a set of processes which detect, for all datagroups dg , all the process events for the different allowed purposes:
Purposes(current) =  dg : Datagroup • process.dg.current.r.t
→ Purposes(current)
Purposes(admin) =  dg : Datagroup • process.dg.admin.r.t
→ Purposes(admin)
...
Purposes(other_purposes) =  dg : Datagroup • process.dg.other_purposes.r.t
→ Purposes(other_purposes)
In an analogous fashion to the tests for collection practices, we define:
TEST3(p) = POLICY1|[{process.dg.p.r.t}]|Purposes(p)
TEST4(p) = POLICY2|[{process.dg.p.r.t}]|Purposes(p)
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Comparing the processing practices of the two policies is done by checking that, for each purpose p,
TEST3(p) ⊑F TEST4(p)
Finally, for comparing sharing practices, we define:
Sharing(ours) =  dg : Datagroup • process.dg.p.ours.t → Sharing(ours)
Sharing(same) =  dg : Datagroup • process.dg.p.same.t → Sharing(same)
...
Sharing(unrelated) =  dg : Datagroup • process.dg.p.unrelated.t → Sharing(unrelated)
We then check refinement between the processes TEST5 and TEST6 for each possible retention r , where:
TEST5(r) = POLICY1|[{share.dg.r}]|Sharing(r)
TEST6(r) = POLICY2|[{share.dg.r}]|Sharing(r)
The refinement check in this case is TEST5 ⊑F TEST6.
6. Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have studied how formal modelling and verification can be applied to the analysis of privacy policies
expressed in P3P. As we have discussed, there are three different classes of problem that this approach is intended to solve:
(a) the need to compare higher-level policies with lower-level implementations, (b) the need to ensure that any one policy
is sensible, plausible, and consistent relative to some objectively agreed standard (since no formal semantics were provided,
especially in the case of P3P, by its authors), and (c) the situation which arises when there are two similar, but not exactly
equal, policies which need to be compared.
We took note of existing work on the formalisation and analysis of policies, though noted a lack of work particularly
related to privacy. Our approach was influenced by [16] and also inspired by the ideas in [18]. We presented a novel and
practical technique for analysing privacy policies and capturing the intentions of their authors. Furthermore, we developed
amodelling framework and code generation tool which can be used to reason about actual P3P policies andwhich is capable
of many further extensions.
In Section 4 we discussed how the CSP model of a P3P policy can be used as a basis to check for internal semantic
consistency. Rather than a syntactic validation (which is a commonly available feature in any XML parser), we are able
to express relationships between different predefined values in the P3P Recommendation.
In Section 5we presented refinement checks whichmay be performed on a pair of policies (after conversion to CSP using
our tool) using the FDR model checker.
Formalising an enterprise’s overall privacy requirements is an arduous and time-consuming task; however, we are aware
that large companies conduct substantial efforts doing just this for their corporate rulebooks. With such a formalisation
at hand, one can check (using the techniques presented in this paper) that the actual privacy policies being used, e.g. on
corporate webpages, conform to company rules. In this paper we have focused on refinement checks between pairs of
policies, and on consistency checking, with the expectation that the techniques used apply equally in the above case.
We believe that this work offers many opportunities for further and related investigations, including the following.
In order to make use of the policy comparison offered by our method, we plan to analyse and contrast privacy policies
from several commercial websites. The Privacy Finder search engine is particularly useful in this regard, since we can locate
sites offering various degrees of privacy and extract their P3P source. We are likely to encounter subtleties and special cases
which will improve our CSP model further. We have used the IBM P3P Policy Editor [11] to create the sample policies for
the analyses presented here.
In order to develop further internal consistency checks for P3P policies, it may be beneficial to combine our techniques
with the algorithm described in [14]. This is likely to result in the development of a comprehensive policy analysis tool,
which invokes FDR behind the scenes.
In connection with our work as part of the EnCoRe project [3], we are particularly keen to investigate the impact of
privacy policies on users, and how best to implement user interfaces and systems that enforce users’ privacy preferences.
A user-side privacy agent may need to compare two websites that a user wishes to view as to their collection, sharing, and
processing practices, so as to show the less privacy-invasive one to the user first; the techniques we have described in this
paper are suited directly to this and related tasks.
We have also developed a logical approach to reasoning about users’ privacy preferences, namely, about the consent and
revocation mechanisms that may be available to them during online transactions [26].
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